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1. Introduction
During the past few years, several authors have studied the problem
of estimating systems of demand equations if a significant proportion of
the observations in the sample contains zero expenditures on one or more
goods. Wales and Woodland (1983) formulate a model based on the Kuhn-
Tucker approach, which is consistent with utility maximizing behaviour and
allows for stochastic preferences. In case an explicit specification of
the direct utility function is available, this approach seems very natural
and intuitively appealing.
The individual is assumed to solve the problem
Max G(x;9,u) s.t. vTx C 1 and x) 0. (1)
x - -
Here x is a K-dimensional vector of quantities, v is a K-dimensional
vector of normalized prices (vi - pi~M (i-1,..,K), where pi is the price
of good i and M is income), G is the (direct) utility function, depending
on a vector 9 of parameters (to be estimated) and a vector u of random
variables (to allow for preference variation between individuals).
Ransom (1987) comments on the relationship between the Wales and
Woodland model and the 'simultaneous equation' Tobit model of Amemiya
(~974) for the special case of a quadratic utility function. He also
discusses, for this special case, the issue of internal consistency, i.e.
the question whether there is a one-to-one correspondence between all
possible realizations of the random variables (except, perhaps, for those
in a set of probability zero) and all possible quantity vectors x that
could be observed. (Alternatively stated: do the probabilities sum to 1?)
Ransom finds that internal consistency is guaranteed if the (quadratic)
direct utility function is strictly concave on the set of feasible
quantities
( x; x) 0}. This result is no surprise, since, if the utility function
is strictly concave, (1) is an example of maximizing a strictly concave
function over a(non-empty) closed convex set and standard Kuhn-Tucker
theory assures us that this problem has one and only one solution.z
Lee and Pitt (1986) propose to use duality theory and shadow prices
in the Wales and Woodland model to be able to deal with more flexible
demand systems for which no explicit specification of the direct utility
function can be given. In particular, they pay attention to the Indirect
Translog system ( see Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (19~5)). Lee and Pitt
do not address the issues of well-behaving of the indirect or direct
utility function or internal consistency. In an earlier paper ( Van Soest
and Kooreman ( 1986)), we showed with a simple example in the three goods
case, that internal consistency can be severely violated for certain
values of parameters oF the indirect translog specification ( which do not
guarantee concavity of the direct utility function in a large enough
region). In this paper, we show that, provided that the parameters satisfy
certain conditions, internal consistency is guaranteed and, moreover, that
the direct utility function behaves well in the feasible region of the
quantity-space.
2. The framework
We start from the indirect utility function
K K K
H(p,M) - ï a, log(p.~M) 4 1~2 i E g.~log(p.~M) log(p.~M) ,





is a vector of prices, M denotes income, a-
T
(a1,.....,aK) is a parameter vector, which is normalized such that ï ai-
i-1
-1 (a may include a random component, as in Lee and Pitt (1986)), and
B-(pi.)K 1 is a matrix of parameters. Without loss of generality, we
J J-
assume that B is symmetric.
Introducing a vector v- p~M of normalized prices, the indirect
utility function can be written as
K K K
H(v) - E a. log(v.) . 1~2 ï E p.~log(~.) log(v~) .





DH~~M - {1 - E L pijlog(vi)}~M .
i-1 j-1
Since the indirect utility function must be increasing as a function of M,
a necessary condition for the use of this specification in the
neighbourhood of a given vector v is:
i K K
D(v) - 1- L ï p..log(v.) ) 0. (2)
i-1 j-1 iJ J
Application of Roy's identity yields the notional (uncompensated) demand
equations:
R A f
si(~) - 2i(~) ~ D (~) .
where
~, K
zi(~) - -ai- E pijlog(vj) (i-1,...,K).
j-1
M M M
Here s (v) -(sl(v),....,sK(v))T is the vector of optimal budget shares,
M N ~
some of which may be negative. We write z(v) -(zl(v),....,zK(v))T.
3. Rationing
Zn the following, we consider a fixed vector v and we derive the
optimal shares si that satisfy si ) 0 (i-1,..,K).
With s .. T -(sl,. .,sK) this can be written as: s) 0.
Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, as in Lee and Pitt (1986) (and thus
implicitly assuming, that the indirect utility function "behaves well in
some large enough region"), the maximization problem can be written as:
Find a vector rt-(rr1,...,nK)T of normalized shadow prices and a
vector s-(sl,....,sk)T of (optimal) shares such that
~ K ,~ K K
si- {zi} ~ Sij(log(vj)- log(nj))}~{D t ï ï pjk(log vj- log rtj})
j-1 j-1 k-1





With y~ - log(~~)- log(R~) (J-1.....K). Y-(Y1......YK)T~
and e-(1,...,1)T, this can be written as:
Find a vector y satisfying:
y ) 0 ,
(z~~ B Y)~(D~. yTB e) ) 0 and Í3)
w
YT (z' BY) -0.
(The corresponding shares are then given by s-{zMt B y}~{D~. yTB
The problem of internal consistency is illustrated by the following
two examples with three commodities.
Example 1
1 2 0 l T
LetB- -240 J
andv- ( 1,1,1 ) .
0 0 1
Figure 1 depicts the number of solutions of (3), for each realization of
the vector a-(al,a2,-1-a1-a2)T of random variables. Each solution is
characterized by some regime, i.e. a subset of {1,2,3} indicating which
constraints are binding.
For example, regime {2} yields the system
Y1- 0 :
y3-0 :
(-a2. 4Y2)~(1 ' 6Y2) - ~ ~
y2) 0 ;5
(-ala 2Y2)~(1 ' 6Y2) ~ ~ ~
-a3~(1 . 6y2) ) 0.
And this system yields a solution iff a3( 0, a2~ 0 and a2~ 2a1.
Figure 1 indicates for each vector a those regimes that yield a solution.
For a with al) 0 and a2C 2a1, no solution is found and for other a's
(except for some set of probability zero) there are two solutions. For









Let B- 1 2 0 and v-( 1,1,1 )T.
0 0 1
The regions in a-space for which solutions for the different regimes
exist are given in Figure 2. In this case, for each a system (3) yields
exactly one solution and the model is internally consistent.
a2 a2-2a1
{3}
Figure 2. Internal consistency in Example 2
0The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for internal
consistency of the model. It is easily proved using the notation
introduced to describe system (3).
Proposition 1:
Assume (A1) B is positive definite
r
(A2) D ) 0
(A3) B e ) 0
Then the problem given by (3) has one and only one solution for all K-
dimensional vectors a.
Proof: D~ ) 0 and B e) 0 imply that Dr~ yTB e) 0 for all y) 0.
This means, that (3) can be rewritten as:
Find a vector y satisfying
y ) 0 ,
.
z t B y) 0 and
N
YT(z 4 B Y) - 0 .
(4)
This problem is known in the literature as the linear complementarity
problem ( see cf. Amemiya ( 19~4) or Eaves (19~1)). It has one unique
solution if all principal minors of B are positive. Since B is symmetric,
this means that B must be positive definite.
Assumptions (A2) and (A3) are necessary to guarantee
. w
D( n) - D t yTB e) 0
for all vectors of shadow prices rt corresponding to all feasible vectors
4
of shares s) 0. As stated in (2), D(rt) ) 0 is a necessary condition for
good behaviour of the indirect utility function, and therefore Assumptions
(A2) and (A3) seem quite reasonable.
Assumption (A1) arises in a similar way, if we consider concavity of the
corresponding cost function.8
4. Concavity in the feasible region of the shares space.
The cost function is only well-behaving in the neighbourhood of a
vector n of shadow prices corresponding to a given vector s of shares, if
the matrix of second order partial derivatives of the cost function with
respect to prices is negative semi-definite. In case oF the translog
function, this means that the matrix
M
C(s) --e(s)ts sT-(D f yTB e)-1{B-s(B e)T-B e sT4eTB e s sT}
must be negative semi-definite. (Here o(s) denotes the diagonal matrix
with si (i-1,...,K) on the diagonal and y corresponds to s, i.e.
y~- log(v~)-log(R~), where R-(R1,...,RK)T is the vector of shadow prices
corresponding to the vector s of shares.)
Proposition 2:
Assume (A1) B is positive definite
w
(A2) D ) 0
(A3) B e ) 0
Then concavity holds for all feasible vectors of shares s) 0.
Proof: the proof is an immediate consequence of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1: If s) 0 and sl~ .... t sK- 1 then ~(s) - s sT is positive semi-
definite.
Lertuna 2: If B is positive definite then B- s(B e)T- B e sT ~ eTB e s
sT is positive semi-definite for all s.
r
Proof of Lemma 1): Without loss of generality we may assume: si~ 0
(i-1,.,K).
We must prove: F(x) :- xT{n(s) - s sT} x) 0 for all vectors x.
i) A more general version of this lemma is proved in Bekker (1986), p. 699
Using standard Lagrange technique, it is easy to show, that F attains a
minimum value of 0(and a maximum value of 1) on the ellipsoid
K
{ x - (x1,...,xK)T; ï sjx~- 1 }
j-1
Since F(ax) -~2F(x) for all real ~, this implies that F(x) ) 0 for all
vectors x.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let x be any K-dimensional non-zero vector. Then
xT(B - s(H e)T- B e sT{ eTB e s sT) x-
- xTB x- 2(xTs)(xTB e) s(xTs)2 eTB e.
This is a quadratic function of xTs, with discriminant
D- 4{(xTB e)2-(xTB x)(eTB e)}.
If B is positive definite, then D C 0(Cauchy-Schwarz), so the function
does not change sign and, because xTB x) 0, it is always nonnegative.
5. Conclusion.
Proposition 1 can intuitively be seen as an immediate consequence of
Proposition 2: Concavity of the cost function is equivaleht to concavity
of the direct utility function on the feasible region S-{s; s) 0 and sTe
C 1}.
Since S is convex, the concave direct utility function attains a unique
maximum on S.
The main problem left seems to be the question, whether the
assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) in Propositions 1 and 2 are necessary. If
they are not, imposition of them might destroy the second order
flexibility of the indirect translog specification. It is easy to see,
that concavity at all vertices (0,..,0,1,0,..,0) of the feasible region S
implies, together with assumptions (A2) and (A3), that all principal (K-
1)x(K-1) submatrices of B must be positive definite. This means that, if
observations in the neighbourhood of all these vertices exist, the10
assumptions do not seem too strong. But what can be left out if, for
example, there is one good with a positive share for everyone, as often
happens in practice ?
Finally, note that assumptions {A1), (A2) and (A3) do not say
anything about a. Hence if the assumptions are met the ai's may vary
randomly and no truncation of their distribution is necessary to assure
that probabilities sum up to 1. Random variation of the ai's implies that
all feasible vectors of shares could be optimal, and thus makes the
assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) "almost" necessary.11
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